Fluid intelligence is a general cognitive ability associated with problem solving in the absence of 25 task-specific knowledge. Neuroscientific studies of fluid intelligence have studied both fluid 26 intelligence tasks of varying difficulty and individual differences in fluid intelligence ability, but have 27 failed to appropriately distinguish the two dimensions. Here we use task-based fMRI (N=34) to show 28 that within and between subject dimensions show both partial overlap and widespread differences. 29
Introduction 40
Fluid intelligence is the ability to think logically and solve novel problems in the absence of task-41 specific knowledge (Horn and Cattell, 1966) . It is a central component of psychometric theories of 42 intelligence (Carpenter et al., 1990; Carroll, 1993; Engle et al., 1999) and closely related to core 43 cognitive abilities including working memory (Engle et al., 1999) , processing speed (Fry and Hale, 44 1996) , attention (Engle, 2002) , general intelligence (Blair, 2006) and executive functions (Salthouse et 45 al., 2003) . Individuals with higher fluid reasoning ability generally have better psychosocial outcomes 46 (Strenze, 2007; Deary, 2012) , lower instances of psychopathology (Gale et al., 2010) and lower 47 morbidity and mortality (Deary et al., 2011) . Moreover, fluid intelligence often declines rapidly in old 48 age Aichele et al., 2015) with adverse consequences for the ability to live and 49 function independently (Salthouse et al., 2003; Tucker-Drob, 2011) . (Duncan et al., 1995; Roca et al., 2010) . Together, these 55 findings converge on a distributed parietal and frontal network associated with fluid reasoning (Kane 56 and Engle, 2002; Jung and Haier, 2007; Fedorenko et al., 2013) . 57
However, studies of fluid intelligence often implicitly conflate two sources of variation: 58
Differences between subjects (i.e., differences in ability) and differences within subjects (i.e., 59 differences in neural responses under varying task difficulty) (see also (Cronbach, 1957; Chabris, 60 2007) . For instance, the Parieto-Frontal integration model (Jung and Haier, 2007 ) is a process model 61 of reasoning behaviour (p. 138). That is, it claims to describe the processes that happen within a 62 subject during complex reasoning. However, it is largely based on neuroimaging studies concerning 63 differences between individuals. This is problematic, as it is well known that these dimensions can, 64 and do, behave independently (Hamaker et al., 2005 ; Penke et al., 2011; Kievit et al., 2013) . This 65 leaves a fundamental ambiguity in what is meant, exactly, by the 'neural substrate' of fluid reasoning 66 (e.g. Prabhakaran et al., 1997) . Does this term refer to the question which neural systems are 67 differentially recruited depending on the complexity of the task, or to which neural systems are 68 differentially active between people of differing fluid reasoning ability? By not addressing the two 69 dimensions of difficulty and ability simultaneously, studies that focus on either dimension implicitly 70 treat the other dimension of variation as a source of noise, affecting the findings to an unknown 71 degree. Understanding this distinction in detail is crucial to our understanding of both the process of 72 fluid reasoning and individual differences in fluid reasoning ability. 73
In the present paper, we use Item Response Theory (IRT, Embretson and Reise, 2013) to 74 decompose neural responses during a fluid reasoning task into an inter-individual dimension and an 75 intra-individual dimension. An IRT model combines item difficulty estimates (intra-individual 76 parameters) with ability estimates for each subject (an inter-individual parameter). Using this model, 77
we can separate neural systems that underlie individual differences those that reflect differences in 78 increasing task difficulty. We hypothesize that the neural networks that are differentially active within 79 people with differing ability are not the same as neural networks that are differentially active within 80 people across tasks of varying difficulty. Crucially, by taking into account both dimensions we can 81 compare individual differences in a novel manner: By selecting a differing subset of items for each 82 individual tailored to their ability level, we can compare individual differences in terms of neural 83 activity patterns whilst keeping intra-individual differences in subjective difficulty constant. Doing so 84
sheds new light on the controversial notion of neural efficiency, and illustrates the power of 85 simultaneously modelling inter-and intra-individual differences in a GLM framework. 
Results

92
Behavioural results
93
To decompose the differential contributions of difficulty and ability in neural response, we fit a 94
Rasch model to the response patterns of a set of Raven's Matrices (see Figure 1 for an example, see 95 materials and methods for more detail Thomas et al., 2013) . In the Rasch model, the difficulty of items is related to the ability of 103 participants by means of a logistic function. The probability that person j with ability θ makes item i 104 with difficulty β correctly can be described by equation (1). 105
Variants of Rasch models are widely used in fields such as educational testing (Bond and Fox, 108 2006 ) and more specific skills such as chess ability (van der Maas and Wagenmakers, 2005) . In the 109 Rasch model we model M dichotomously scored items (1=correct, 0=incorrect) for N persons. Each 110 item has a difficulty parameter β, and each person has an ability parameter θ. We fit a Rasch model in 111 considered both null-responses (no response within the 30 second time limit) and incorrect responses 113 as incorrect, giving each participant a potential range of 0 to 72 correct. The 34 participants made an 114 average of 39.6 items correct (range: min=19, max=53, SD=8.8). The mean reaction time across 115 individuals was 15.90s, SD= 2.39s, with an item level RT ranging from 1.2 s to a maximum of 29.99 s. 116
To best estimate the ability parameter (θ) of each participant, we fixed the difficulty parameters (β) of 117 the 72 items based on the Ravens standardization sample (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1996) . The 118 difficulty parameters of the items ranged from -3.59 to 4.8, capturing a wide range of difficulties. The 119
Andersen Likelihood-Ratio test (Andersen, 1973) indicated that the response pattern fit the Rasch 120 model adequately: χ 2 (46, N=34)= 38.739, p=.767. Figure 2 To ensure that our sample of participants performed the test accurately, we next fit the 123 model without the item-level constraints, to examine whether the difficulties estimated in our sample 124 matched the difficulties based on the standardization sample. Despite a relatively small sample size, 125 the betas showed a high degree of convergence with published standards (r (70) =.85, p<.0001). 126
Further analyses showed that more difficult items (with higher betas) were associated with slower 127 response times (Spearman's r of reaction times with correct response: r (2446) =.55, p<.0001), were 128 less likely to be made correctly (Spearman's r difficulty with correct response= r (2446) =-.59, 129 p<.0001) and were more likely to be null-responses (Spearman's r difficulty with null response = r 130 Figure 2: Item-characteristic curves for all 72 items (top). The 72 Raven's matrices items represented as ranging from easy (green/left) to hard (red/right). Ability is modelled such that person parameter theta corresponds to the probability of person j making item i correctly. The difficulty of an item (beta) can be read off by looking up the position on the X-axis that corresponds to a probability of .5 of making that item correctly (example shown in blue).
First, we examined which regions showed more activity for more difficult items when including all 142 individuals and all difficulty levels. To do so, we take the beta estimates of the difficulty of the 72 143 items as shown in Figure 2 , and used them to predict differential brain activity for each individual, 144 controlling for individual differences in mean activity, with a FLAME random effects analysis. We 145 include both correct and incorrect items, as the cognitive processes that ultimately lead to incorrect 146 answers are as much part of fluid reasoning as the cognitive processes that lead to correct responses. 147 that activity in as varying parametrically in activity with an increase in complexity (Kroger et al., 2002) . 152
Together, this activity pattern is broadly in line with a broad, parieto-frontal network often associated 153 with complex tasks (Jung and Haier, 2007; Table 1 : Spatial activity maps associated with an increase in item-difficulty (top), with peak activations of each of the five clusters shown below. No regions showed less activity for more difficult items.
Individual differences in neural networks during fluid reasoning
Second, we examined individual differences in neural responses during the fluid reasoning 156 task. The ability estimates theta, one for each participant (shown in Figure 2 , bottom), were entered 157 into a FLAME random effects analysis to account for individual differences in ability. The results in 158 
Conjunction and disjunction of intra-and inter-individual dimensions: 176
Next, we formally examine the (dis)similarities between the inter-and intra-individual 177 dimensions. This is of interest for both methodological and intrinsic reasons. First, the extent to which 178 these dimensions differ will illustrate the methodological perils of conflating the inter-and intra-179 individual dimensions. To examine to what extent these two dimensions differed, we examine where 180 in the brain the activity associated with differences in item difficulty was greater than the activity 181 associated with differences in ability, and vice versa. The former contrast yielded no significant 182 regions of interest, suggesting there are no regions of the brain that are more active for more difficult 183 trials that aren't also more active in people with higher ability. However, the converse contrast 184 (where in the brain are individual differences in ability greater than differences due to item difficulty) 185 showed widespread bilateral regions where the differences as a function of ability where greater than 186 the differences associated with difficulty ( Figure 5 ). These analyses suggest that neural patterns as a 187 function of individual differences seem to be more spatially distributed than intra-individual 188 differences as a function of task difficulty. This is the case despite the fact that the items ranged from 189 extremely easy (made correctly by every person) to extremely hard (not being made correctly by any 190
The second question we can ask is not where these two dimensions differ, but where they 192 overlap. It has long been known, although often ignored, that only in highly specific circumstances can 193 we infer intra-individual processes from inter-individual differences (or vice versa). This inference is 194 only valid when a process is ergodic (Molenaar, 2004) . Ergodicity implies that the statistical 195 characterization of within-subject variation is (asymptotically) identical to the variation at the level of 196 the group (Molenaar, 2004; Molenaar and Campbell, 2009 ), which is very unlikely for most 197 psychological constructs (Kievit et al., 2013) . Although ergodicity is usually framed within the context 198 of (natural) variation over time, it can be equally useful to describe intra-individual differences in task 199 complexity (in which case it is closely related to inter-individual measurement invariance, e.g. see it is still a relatively neglected topic. Generally, these techniques examine 'global 'ergodicity, that is, 203 are the observed patterns as a whole identical for inter and intra-individual comparisons. We here 204 propose a more lenient, but conceptually useful, form of ergodicity for neuroimaging: Where in the 205 brain does intra-individual manipulation yield the same differential activity as that which characterizes 206 11 inter-individual differences on that task (e.g. Sliwinski et al., 2010; Raz and Lindenberger, 2011; 207 Voelkle et al., 2014)? We refer to this pattern as local ergodicity. 208
Such an analysis is useful for a variety of reasons. First, it forces us to make explicit the distinction 209 between intra-and inter-individual differences, an issue often neglected in cognitive neuroscience. the statistical maps of the first two analyses (intra-individual differences in difficulty shown in Figure 3  223 and inter-individual differences in ability shown in Figure 4 ). Figure 6 shows the parietofrontal regions 224 that are more active both as a function of increasing item difficulty and increased ability, and can be 225 said to display local neural ergodicity. These regions can be described broadly as three clusters: The 226 bilateral angular gyri in the superior parietal cortices, the bilateral precunei and the right middle and In its most common form, neural efficiency is the claim that individuals of higher ability show less 237 activity during cognitive tasks because they 'display a more focused cortical activation during 238 cognitive performance resulting in lower total brain activation than in less intelligent individual' 239 (Neubauer et al., 2002, p. 515 ). However, this concept has been challenged recently for being little 240 more than a tautological redescription of the data (cf. Poldrack, 2014, p. 2) such that 'those of higher 241 ability' finding the same task 'less hard work'. A more relevant question, we argue, is to compare 242 individuals of different abilities when they are forced to 'work equally hard' (We note that Neubauer 243 and Fink, 2009, do mention task complexity as a possible moderator of neural efficiency, e.g. pp. 244 1013). In other words, to meaningfully study differences in the processes that occur when individuals 245 are being challenged cognitively (high difficulty), we must control for baseline differences in ability. 246
Doing so, we can study the more relevant question of whether differences between individuals in 247 fluid reasoning ability are associated with different cognitive patterns that would be suggestive of 248 13 different cognitive strategies when performing items of equal difficulty. Item response theory allows 249 for an easy way to separate difficulty and ability in precisely this manner. 250
For this analysis, we must ensure we select a subset of items that are equally difficult for all 251 individuals. To do so we can simply subtract individual ability scores (theta) from the difficulty of each 252 item (beta), to get a corrected difficulty score for each item, for each person. Next, we select a subset 253 of all 72 items for each individual, such that that the range of items is equal in difficulty across all 254 individuals. If after controlling for individual differences we find different patterns of activation, this 255 would suggest that people who score more highly on Raven's matrices don't simply make more items 256 correctly: They recruit different neural networks than those with lower ability, even when making 257 items of equal (subjective) difficulty. 258
We selected a subset of 30 items for every individual such that the mean corrected difficulty 259 (defined as the difficulty of the items minus the ability of the participants) of those items was equal 260 for every individual. We compared these subsets across every pair of individuals and found no 261 significant differences in corrected item difficulties (all p's>0.069). However, significance tests are 262 poorly equipped to quantify the absence of effects (Wagenmakers, 2007) , so we reran this 263 comparison using default Bayesian t-tests (Morey and Rouder, 2013) . This analysis showed no 264 evidence for significant differences and considerable evidence for an absence of such differences 265 (mean BF 01 = 2.95, max BF 01 = .92). Next, we repeated the analysis shown in Figure 3 by first; 266 calculating per subject, a dummy contrast for the trials that where equated for difficulty (e.g. equally 267 difficult given the capacity of the subject) and using these in a FLAME analysis in which we entered This analysis shows there are differences in neural activity between individuals of higher and 295 lower fluid reasoning ability even when they perform equally challenging tasks. Next we may ask what 296 these differences reveal about the cognitive processes underlying these differences. Inferring mental 297 states and styles from neuroimaging patterns is notoriously complex (Henson, 2005; Poldrack, 2006) . 298
However, we can use Neurosynth (http://neurosynth.org/, Yarkoni et al., 2011) , an automated meta-299 analysis tool using automated analysis of neuroimaging data and keyword frequency across more 300 Table 3 : Greater activity in people with higher fluid intelligence (cyan) and lower fluid intelligence (yellow/orange) once item difficulty has been equated across individuals. This pattern suggests that, beyond the unidimensionality of the behavioural variables, there exist individual differences in neural responses during fluid reasoning items. Using Neurosynth suggests these differences are compatible with a more memory-and rule maintenance based strategy for individuals with high fluid intelligence compared to a more visual, object-oriented strategy by individuals with lower ability. than 11,000 studies. This database makes it possible to provide a descriptive heuristic of cognitive 301 states possibly associated with activity patterns, based on what has been reported in previous studies. 302
Specifically, we can use the peak activations as shown above for both difficulty and ability to compute 303 the posterior probability of a certain keyword being mentioned with high frequency (>1 in 1000) in 304 any of the articles included in the database that also report activity in that cluster. Performing this 305 analysis for the peak cluster above shows that the peak activation of the cluster that is more active in 306 people with lower gf (X= 40mm, Y=-82mm, Z=34mm) has a posterior probability of .79 with the 307 keyword 'objects'. This is in line, tentatively, with the hypothesis that individuals with lower fluid 308 intelligence, on average, rely on more purely visual strategies when performing fluid reasoning tasks. 309
In contrast, the peak cluster for individuals with higher fluid intelligence (X= -30mm, Y=52mm, 310
Z=2mm) is instead associated with keywords such as 'memory' (posterior probability=.7), 'retrieval' 311 (posterior probability=.74) and 'maintaining' (posterior probability=.83). This is compatible with the 312 hypothesis that individuals with higher fluid intelligence rely more on more frontal and prefrontal 313 regions associated with memory and rule based strategies to solve fluid reasoning items. However, 314 specific paradigms (e.g. selective disruption of via TMS of frontal versus occipital regions) would be 315 necessary to support this hypothesis, as Neurosynth in isolation can only provide part of the picture 316 (cf. Yarkoni, 2015a, 2015b). If our inference above is correct, higher gf individuals would be more 317 adversely affected by lateral frontal stimulation whereas lower gf individuals would be more affected 318 by high visual disruption. 319
Together, these results suggest that when individuals who vary in ability have been matched to 320 perform tasks that are equally difficult, there are noticeable differences in neural patterns, such that 321 people of higher ability show relatively more left lateralized prefrontal activity, whereas individuals 322 with lower ability show more right lateralized higher visual activity. These findings do not support the 323 general neural efficiency hypothesis, instead suggesting more complex qualitative differences 324 between high and low ability individuals. Our analysis shows how we can refine this question using 325 psychometric techniques such that neuroimaging can reveal individual differences beyond a well-326 fitting unidimensional of purely behavioural data. We agree with Poldrack (2014) that neural 327 efficiency as it is often operationalized will rarely be the question we are interested in, and suggest 328 that psychometric techniques are more commonly used to refine the question at hand. 329
Discussion 330
In this study we decompose two distinct but equally important dimensions of fluid intelligence: 331
Intra-individual differences in neural responses to items of varying difficulty and inter-individual 332 differences in neural activity for individuals of differing fluid reasoning ability. We use a parametric IRT 333 model to show that greater ability in fluid intelligence is associated with broad, bilateral increases in 334 activation of fronto-parietal regions, whereas increases in activity within individuals as a function of 335 difficulty are associated with a more focal set of regions including the angular gyri and the precunei. 336
In addition to these differences, we find a subset of three cortical systems, namely bilateral parietal, dimensions suggest that many study designs may not be tailored to answer the question of interest in 360 the most efficient, or even most accurate, way -Findings of individual differences will depend, in 361 part, on the range of item difficulties presented, and findings of parametric difficulty will depend on 362 the mean ability and range of the population being studied. 363
Although the current approach represents a step forward in modelling the con-and divergence of 364 two psychologically relevant dimensions, we are aware that we implicitly assume homogeneity in 365 several other potentially dimensions. For instance, our study focuses on an age range (18-30) within 366 which fluid intelligence is relatively stable. This means that in a sample with a larger age range, there 367 is possibility that the neural systems underlying individual differences in fluid intelligence will be 368 distinct from individual differences (of the same magnitude) seen in our sample. Future research may 369 extend these findings by the better integration of the temporal dynamics of the cognitive processes Presentation® (Neurobs, 2011) . Participants viewed the screen (61 cm x 36 cm) on which the stimuli 405 were presented via a mirror mounted on the head coil. Participants had a four-button box in each 406 hand to respond to the eight clearly marked answer options. Prior to the first scan subjects were able 407 to practice pressing the buttons with visual feedback to ensure correct response mapping. 408
All raw behavioural data and an analysis script written in R (Team, 2014) Prior to the scanning session, subjects read instructions and performed 12 practice trials (not 418 used in the study) to ensure they understood the task. After ensuring the instructions were clear, 419 participants were placed in the scanner. Each block consisted of 12 Raven's matrices, interspersed by 420 a 16 second inter-trial interval, with a maximum 30 second response window for each item. The 421 blocks were pseudo-randomized such that each of the six blocks contained 12 fixed items spanning 422 the complete range of difficulty (from easy to difficult), but were randomized within each block. This 423 ensured that subjects did not 'give up' because trials became increasingly complex within or across 424 blocks. 425
426
Image acquisition and pre-processing
427
Imaging data were obtained at the University of Amsterdam Spinoza Centre for Functional 428
Magnetic Resonance Imaging using a 3-T Philips Achieva TX scanner using an 8-channel head coil. 429
During the presentation of the Raven tasks we recorded BOLD-MRI (GE-EPI, TR=2346 ms, TE=30 ms, 430 FA=90⁰, transversal recording, FOV=200^2 mm, matrix size=80^2, 39 slices, slice thickness=3, slice 431 gap=0.3, ascending acquisition). We also acquired a high-resolution anatomical recording (3DT1, 432 TR=8.1 ms, TE=3.74, FA=8⁰, FOV=240*220*188 mm, voxel size=1 mm^3) for normalization purposes. 433
Foldable foam pads were used to minimize head motion. Data were analysed using FSL (FMRIB's 434 Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl, MATLAB (Version 7.10.0, The Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA, 435 USA), and R (Team, 2014) . Functional data were analysed using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool 436
Version 5.98), in which we performed motion correction, slice time correction, spatial smoothing 437 (5mm) and low pass filtering (100 s). We generated explanatory variables for each individual 438 presented item of the Raven's progressive matrices using the double gamma model of the 439 hemodynamic response function. This yielded 12 explanatory variables (EV's) per run. These EVs were 440
subsequently combined using a model in which we specified both the mean activation level and the 441 item difficulty for each item. This yielded an estimate, per subject, of the extent to which activity of 442 voxels differed across items varying in item difficulty. At the between-subject level we specified a 443 model in which the average activity of the covariate fit from the fixed effects pooling stage was 444 entered and in which the ability of the individual subjects was included as a predictor, so we could the 445 estimate the effects of item difficulty independently of subject ability. Higher-level analysis was 446 carried out using FLAME (FMRIB's Local Analysis of Mixed Effects) stage 1 and stage 2 with automatic 447 outlier detection (Woolrich et al., 2004; Woolrich, 2008) . Statistics were thresholded using cluster-448 based correction at z=2.3 and a corrected cluster significance threshold of 0.05 (Worsley, 2001 ) 449 450 451 23
